

The Long Shadow of Extraction

THE ORIGINS OF INDIGENOUS
AUTONOMY DEMANDS

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APPENDICES

TABLE OA1. Fifteen Peruvian provinces with largest hacienda population (as % of rural population, 1940)

Province	Hacienda population (1940)	Department	Altitude
Manu	1	Madre de Dios	365
Lima	0.871	Lima	153
Chiclayo	0.831	Lambayeque	47
Trujillo	0.808	La Libertad	47
Callao	0.784	Callao	12
Santa	0.698	Ancash	30
Pacasmayo	0.612	La Libertad	70
Jaen	0.541	Cajamarca	740
La Convención	0.541	Cusco	1095
Chancay	0.537	Lima	60
Cañete	0.522	Lima	96
Paucartambo	0.519	Cusco	3042
Huallaga	0.486	San Martin	380
Pisco	0.456	Ica	1

Note: Provinces in highland departments are bolded.

Source: Peru Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos (1944); Perez (1972).

TABLE OA2. Regression of Leguía road on Qhapaq Ñan province

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	KM of road built (1)	Leguía road (dummy) (2)
Qhapaq Ñan province	133,078.400*** (4,231.324)	0.361*** (0.022)
Constant	55,362.400*** (1,752.583)	0.155*** (0.012)
df	52	51
F	989.2	279.4

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Dummy indicator for Leguía road equals 1 if roads were built and 0 if no roads were built. Data collected from (Regal 1936; Ministerio de Fomento 1930; Díez Canseco and Aguilar Revoredo 1929; Peru 1929; Portaro 1930).

TABLE OA3. Collection of Prestación Vial tax in Potosí, 1916–1917

Province	Paying in cash	Paying in labor	% in labor
Frías	300	3,000	91%
Linares	500	12,000	96%
Chayanta	500	9,500	95%
Charcas	400	8,000	95%
Sud Chichas	1,400	7,000	83%
Porco	2,500	3,000	55%
Bustillo	4,000	5,000	56%
Nor Chichas	500	8,000	94%
Nor Lipez	50	1,000	95%
Sud Lipez	0	500	100%
Oficina de Potosí	2,500	2,500	50%
Total	12,650	59,500	82%

Source: Prefecto de Potosí (1916).

TABLE OA4. Prestación vial population and total population, by department (Bolivia, 1900–1908)

Department	Enrolled	Total	Rate
La Paz	99,826	426,930	23.4%
El Beni	8,000	25,680	31.2%
Oruro	18,500	86,081	21.5%
Cochabamba	53,912	326,153	16.5%
Santa Cruz	40,000	189,592	21.1%
Potosi	49,460	325,615	15.2%
Chuquisaca	34,139	196,434	17.4%
Tarija	12,068	67,887	17.8%
Total	315,905	1,644,372	19.2%

Note: Includes total population for the department in 1900, as well as data from the 1908 padrones of the Prestación Vial.
Source: Ministerio de Gobierno y Fomento (1908); Oficina Nacional de Inmigración, Estadística y Propaganda Geográfica (1904).

TABLE OA5. Relationship between hacienda prevalence and assimilation (Peru, with controls)

	(1)
Hacienda pop. (1940)	−0.408** (0.167)
Urbanization rate (1940)	−0.007*** (0.002)
Road (10,000s km)	−1.346 (1.596)
Intercept	0.804*** (0.074)
Num. obs.	102
R2	0.233
R2 Adj.	0.210

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Self-identification measure taken from the 2017 Census question: According to your customs and traditions, do you consider yourself...? Answers included Indigenous and non-Indigenous (White, Mestizo, Afro-descendant) identities. Answers indicating an Indigenous group (e.g., Quechua, Aymara) are coded as 1 and all other answers are coded as 0. Hacienda population coded as percent of total rural population (1940). Road variable examines how many kilometers (in 10,000s of km) were constructed by 1930.
Sources: Perez (1972); Ministerio de Fomento (1930).

TABLE OA6. Relationship between hacienda prevalence and peasant movements (Bolivia, with controls)

	(1)
Hacienda prevalence (1950)	0.488*** (0.154)
Railroad (binary)	−0.165 (0.153)
Road (binary)	0.031 (0.149)
Indig. core area	0.362*** (0.102)
Intercept	−0.171* (0.094)
Num. obs.	62
R2	0.234
R2 Adj.	0.180

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Hacienda prevalence is constructed using the land occupied by haciendas as a percentage of total land. Movements are coded based on whether there was a peasant movement in 1946 or 1947.

Sources: Bolivia Dirección General de Estadística y Censos (1956), Rivera Cusicanqui (1987, 55), Grieshaber (1980); Marsh (1928); Bolivia (1902); Walle (1914).




FIGURE OA1. Attitudes toward government responsibilities: Communal land protection vs. infrastructure development (Oaxaca, Mexico, 2016)

Note: Figure plots whether respondents believed the government should protect community land, invest in infrastructure projects, or both. Results include those living under Indigenous autonomy arrangements (usos) and those living in party-governed (party) areas. $N = 2,016$.

Source: Meixueiro et al. (2020).




FIGURE OA2. Change in the prevalence of communal labor between 1986 and 2016

Note: Data taken from a survey conducted by the author with current and former community presidents in Cusco. The first panel examines responses to two questions that asked community presidents to estimate the number of public goods provided using unpaid communal labor in 1986 and in 2016; responses are coded based on whether presidents estimated more, fewer, or the same number of public goods being produced. The second panel contains a response to a more direct version of the question, which asked whether members of the president's community were more/less/equally likely to participate in unpaid labor events. The final panel uses the same question as the second panel but offers a prime to community leaders mentioning that many community members are now accustomed to receiving a wage for their work. $N = 314$.




FIGURE OA3. Hacienda expansion in Southern Peru: Puno
Note: Data for the department of Puno.
Source: Flores Galindo (1977, 153).




FIGURE OA4. Indigenous land sales to non-Indigenous large landowners in the nineteenth century
Note: Data for the Azángaro province in the department of Puno.
Source: Jacobsen (1993, 208).




FIGURE OA5. Land purchases by profession (% of total, 1880–1920)
Source: Grieshaber (1990).




FIGURE OA6. Histogram of Indigenous communal land purchases by non-Indigenous individuals (% of land in 1877, districts)
Note: Data collected from the department of La Paz.
Source: Grieshaber (1990).




FIGURE OA7. Early hacienda expansion and community leader power (author survey in Cusco, 2017)

Outcome variable is a dichotomized version of responses to a question asked of community presidents: How many communal labor events did you organize in the past year? Early hacienda expansion areas include communities in Paruro and Paucartambo. Non-early expansion areas are Acomayo, Cusco, Calca, Quispicanchi, Anta, Canchis, and Chumbivilcas. $N = 318$.

Source: Author survey of community presidents, Cusco.




FIGURE OA8. Support for Indigenous autonomy, 2020
Note: Data taken from an original survey, conducted by the author, of Indigenous residents of Bolivia. I subset the data into the 329 respondents who report being members of an Indigenous community. The dependent variable is calculated based on the following question: Indigenous communities and municipalities have been given the opportunity to decide whether they want to pursue Indigenous autonomy in order to have greater control over local decisions, allocate their own resources, and spend money as they see fit. To what extent would you agree with your municipality’s pursuing this Indigenous autonomy? Respondents could choose “Strongly agree,” “Agree,” “Somewhat disagree,” and “Strongly disagree.” The first two options were coded as 1 and the second two options were coded as 0.




FIGURE OA9. Difference in Indigenous mobilization by Qhapaq Ñan province
Note: Data coded at the municipal level. Data taken from Ministerio de Vivienda, Construcción, y Saneamiento (2009); Regal (1936); Ministerio de Fomento (1930); Díez Canseco and Aguilar Revoredo (1929); Peru (1929); Portaro (1930); as well as from Kapsoli (1982); Kapsoli and Reátegui (1987); Kammann (1982); and Boletines de Asuntos Indígenas.




FIGURE OA10. Location of subcommittees of Tahuantinsuyo in conscription and non-conscription provinces
Note: Author analysis based on data from Melgar Bao (1988). Conscription eligibility determined by location of Qhapaq Ñan.




FIGURE OA11. The prevalence of Indigenous communal labor for various community projects, 1962
Note: $N = 651$.
Source: Dobyns (1964).




FIGURE OA12. The prevalence of Indigenous communal labor for various community projects, 1962
 $N = 651$.
Source: Dobyns (1964).




FIGURE OA13. State-led extraction, limited hacienda expansion, and community leader power (author survey in Cusco, 2017)
Note: The outcome variable is a dichotomized version of responses to a question asked of community presidents: How many communal labor events did you organize in the past year? State-led extraction and limited hacienda expansion areas include communities in Canas.




FIGURE OA14. State-led extraction, limited hacienda expansion, and demands for autonomy

Note: The outcome variable is a dummy measure of whether communities have a completed communal land title and have achieved recognition. State-led extraction and limited hacienda expansion areas include communities in Canas, Canchis, and Quispicanchi. $N = 540$.

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (2014).




FIGURE OA15. Effect of labor conscription on market integration: RDD
Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. Point estimates taken from a local-linear regression-discontinuity analysis. 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals plotted. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that captures whether communities engage in “productive or business activities”: agriculture, live-stock, agricultural machinery, agrobusiness, marketing, mining, forestry, or tourism. The running variable is the municipality’s distance from a border dividing a treated (i.e., Qhapaq Ñan) province from a control one. SEs clustered at province level. Data taken from Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (2014). Table D3 contains further information. Bias-corrected estimates include robust confidence intervals. $N = 2,778$.