

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments xiii

Preface to the Paperback Edition xv

Introduction 1

2015-2016 17

- 1** The Not-So-Silent White Majority 19
Nov. 16, 2016
- 2** The Great Trump Reshuffle 27
May 4, 2016
- 3** Why Trump Now? 34
March 1, 2016
- 4** How the Other Fifth Lives 41
April 27, 2016
- 5** Whose Neighborhood Is It? 49
Sept. 19, 2015
- 6** Purity, Disgust, and Donald Trump 57
Jan. 6, 2016
- 7** Donald Trump's Alt-Reality 64
Dec. 15, 2016

- 2017** 71
- 8** Reaching Out to the Voters the Left Left Behind 73
April 13, 2017
- 9** Democracy, Disrupted 83
March 2, 2017
- 10** Democracy Can Plant the Seeds of Its Own Destruction 89
Oct. 19, 2017
- 11** President Trump Is the Enemy of Their Enemies 98
May 4, 2017
- 12** The End of the Left and the Right as We Knew Them 106
June 22, 2017
- 13** Trump Says Jump. His Supporters Ask, How High? 114
Sept. 14, 2017
- 14** The Increasing Significance of the Decline of Men 122
March 16, 2017
- 2018** 129
- 15** Robots Can't Vote, but They Helped Elect Trump 131
Jan. 11, 2018
- 16** Trump's Tool Kit Does Not Include the Constitution 138
Feb. 8, 2018
- 17** Trump against the Liberal Tide 146
May 31, 2018
- 18** The Class Struggle according to Donald Trump 155
June 7, 2018
- 19** How Much Can Democrats Count on Suburban Liberals? 163
June 14, 2018

- 20** Why Don't We Always Vote in Our Own Self-Interest? 171
July 19, 2018
- 21** The Democrats' Left Turn Is Not an Illusion 180
Oct. 18, 2018
- 22** In Our "Winner-Take-Most" Economy, the Wealth Is Not Spreading 189
July 26, 2018
- 2019** 199
- 23** The Deepening "Racialization" of American Politics 201
Feb. 27, 2019
- 24** No One Should Take Black Voters for Granted 211
Sept. 11, 2019
- 25** Red and Blue Voters Live in Different Economies 219
Sept. 25, 2019
- 26** How Can Democrats Keep Themselves from Overreaching? 225
Oct. 9, 2019
- 27** Is Politics a War of Ideas or of Us against Them? 233
Nov. 6, 2019
- 2020** 241
- 28** Trump Has His Sights Set on Black Voters 243
March 4, 2020
- 29** How Far Might Trump Go? 253
Oct. 28, 2020
- 30** What Is Trump Playing At? 262
Nov. 11, 2020

- 31** “The Far Left Is the Republicans’ Finest Asset” 272
Nov. 18, 2020
- 32** America, We Have a Problem 283
Dec. 16, 2020
- 2021** 291
- 33** “The Capitol Insurrection Was as Christian Nationalist as It Gets” 293
Jan. 28, 2021
- 34** White Riot 302
Jan. 13, 2021
- 35** Democracy Is Weakening Right in Front of Us 312
Feb. 17, 2021
- 36** Why Trump Still Has Millions of Americans in His Grip 322
May 5, 2021
- 37** Is Wokeness “Kryptonite for Democrats”? 331
May 26, 2021
- 38** Is Education No Longer the “Great Equalizer”? 340
June 23, 2021
- 39** Trump’s Cult of Animosity Shows No Sign of Letting Up 349
July 7, 2021
- 40** How Strong Is America’s Multiracial Democracy? 359
Sept. 1, 2021
- 41** “It’s Become Increasingly Hard for Them to Feel Good about Themselves” 367
Sept. 22, 2021
- 42** Democrats Can’t Just Give the People What They Want 375
Oct. 13, 2021

43 The Moral Chasm That Has Opened Up between Left and Right Is Widening 385

Oct. 27, 2021

44 America Has Split, and It's Now in "Very Dangerous Territory" 393

Jan. 26, 2022

Conclusion 402

Notes 407

Index of Names 411

Index of Subjects 417

Introduction

The years following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 saw the abandonment of the Democratic Party by the white American South. That partisan realignment led slowly but directly to the arrival of Donald Trump, a supremely dangerous man—an enemy of racial justice—at the pinnacle of American power, where despite his narrow loss in 2020 he still lodges.

Many of the conflicts dividing Americans today have their roots in the civil rights movement and broader rights revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s—and in the reactionary response to those revolutions. Progressive insurgencies granted full citizenship to African Americans, empowered previously marginalized populations, and diversified the Democratic Party. They also mandated legal and constitutional protections for women, ethnic and racial minorities, criminal defendants, the poor, homosexuals, the handicapped, and the mentally ill.

The strategy that Trump, ever the opportunist, adopted when he launched his bid for the presidency was the white supremacist position that had been unambiguously articulated nearly six decades earlier by archconservative *National Review* editor William F. Buckley in his August 1957 essay “Why the South Must Prevail”: “The issue is

whether the White community in the South is entitled to take such measures as are necessary to prevail, politically and culturally, in the areas in which it does not predominate numerically. The sobering answer is Yes.” Buckley argued that this is “because, for the time being, it is the advanced race.” The question, then, “as far as the White community is concerned, is whether the claims of civilization supersede those of universal suffrage.” Buckley’s answer: “The *National Review* believes that the South’s premises are correct. If the majority wills what is socially atavistic, then to thwart the majority may be, though undemocratic, enlightened.”

By the late 1960s it had become uncommon for people to explicitly express racially insensitive views. Buckley soon renounced his own editorial, and Republicans in general swiftly shifted to code words and phrases, such as “law and order,” “the silent majority,” and “welfare queens.”

Still, the rights revolutions had given political conservatives a powerful tool to mobilize voters—especially lower- and middle-income non-college-educated whites who felt the Democratic Party had abandoned them. In 1964 many of these Southern voters supported Barry Goldwater, who carried Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina. By January 1976, Ronald Reagan picked up the racist mantle and regaled his Asheville, North Carolina, audience on the campaign trail with this oft-disputed anecdote: “In Chicago, they found a woman who holds the record. She used 80 names, 30 addresses, 15 telephone numbers to collect food stamps, Social Security, veterans’ benefits for four nonexistent deceased veteran husbands, as well as welfare.” “In fact,” Reagan added, “her tax-free cash income alone has been running at \$150,000 a year.”²¹

By the time of Reagan’s 1980 victory, the Republican Party had become the home of racial reaction.

Fueling the conservative response to the civil rights revolution of the mid-1960s was the onset of a surge in immigration to the United States following enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.

According to the official House of Representatives description of the law, “Congress erected a legal framework that prioritized

highly skilled immigrants and opened the door for people with family already living in the United States. The popular bill passed the House, 318 to 95. The law capped the number of annual visas at 290,000, which included a restriction of 20,000 visas per country per year. But policymakers had vastly underestimated the number of immigrants who would take advantage of the family reunification clause.”²

In 1970, 4.7 percent of this country’s population was foreign born; by 2019, that had shot up to 13.7 percent. In actual numbers, there were 9.6 million immigrants in 1970; in 2019, there were 44.9 million, a 263 percent increase, with most of the new immigrants coming from Latin America, Asia, and Africa rather than the countries of northern, western, eastern, or southern Europe.³

For Trump, it has been a simple matter to focus native discontent on the surge in foreign-born low-wage workers competing for jobs and—in the view of his partisans—transforming American culture. He has demonized immigrants in countless ways, including by disparaging countries with majority-Black populations and supporting participants in the August 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville.⁴

Understanding the role of increasing racial and ethnic diversity in empowering the contemporary conservative movement is crucial to understanding contemporary American politics—but there is more to American politics than that. These developments are explored in my 1992 book, *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics*, and in my May 1991 *Atlantic* article, “When the Official Subject Is Presidential Politics, Taxes, Welfare, Crime, Rights, or Values . . . the Real Subject Is Race.”⁵

The post-1964 Democratic Party quickly became a biracial coalition—and more recently a multiracial, multiethnic coalition. An increasingly influential upscale wing has also emerged as growing numbers of white, college-educated voters abandoned the Republican Party and, supporting more liberal politics, became Democrats.

The knowledge class in the post-World War II era has shaped, and was shaped by, the human rights, civil rights, antiwar, feminist, and gay rights movements, as well as by the broader sexual and information

revolutions. Members of this class—academics, artists, editors, human relations managers, lawyers, librarians, architects, journalists, psychologists, social workers, teachers, and therapists, as well as those in engineering, the sciences, finance, and other technology-focused domains—have had their lives upended by the legalization of contraception and abortion, by no-fault divorce, feminism, new behavioral norms, the effective disappearance of censorship, and the abolition of mandatory military service.

In the context of this ongoing state of flux are concerns among the growing numbers of college-educated voters who are preoccupied with reproductive rights, the environment, self-actualization, nonviolence, aesthetic fulfillment, racial and gender equality, and the administration of justice. This upscale cohort within the Democratic coalition is intensely hostile to agendas of imposed moral orthodoxy—often to religious observance itself—and particularly to the agenda of the socially conservative Right. The interests of these voters do not necessarily, or reliably, coincide with the priorities of the less privileged, and they often conflict with the values and religiosity of millions of middle- and working-class voters—many of them low wage, with only high school educations—who often find themselves disempowered, annoyed by, and resentful of contemporary cultural trends.

Across both parties, one's identity as a man or woman; as a heterosexual, homosexual, or transgender person; as white, Black, or Hispanic; as a feminist; as a Southerner; as a Christian; as tolerant or a disciplinarian; as an individualist or collectivist; as a pacifist or militarist; as a cosmopolitan or provincial; as an egalitarian—these and more have become a part of one's being as a liberal or Democrat on one side or as a conservative or Republican on the other.

Contemporary partisan schisms are far deeper and more irresolvable than past conflicts that positioned economic liberals and the Democratic Party against free market advocates and the Republican Party. Particularistic identities across the spectrum have now become consistent and coherent, what political scientists call “sorted”—into two competing and increasingly hostile identities, progressive or conservative, Democrat or Republican. One's sense

of self has become deeply entwined with one's partisan allegiance, escalating the stakes for both sides.

The subordination of economic to cultural and racial issues as the prime factors in elections has imposed significant consequences on those least equipped to bear the costs. In effect, the internal realignment of the Democratic Party has left without effective representation the broad class interests of those in the bottom half of the income distribution—those millions, of all races and ethnicities, without college degrees and with household incomes in the 25th to 65th percentile—just when the need for a strong political voice has intensified, especially for those left behind by the exacerbation of global competition that began in the early 1970s. Over subsequent decades, American corporations have cut pay and benefits for many workers in order to compete with low-wage producers in foreign countries, abandoning the post-World War II concord between labor and management and outsourcing production to factories abroad, while automation continues to transform the need for skills that used to be the province of human beings alone.

Artificial intelligence, argued MIT economist Daron Acemoglu in a September 2021 essay, “Harms of AI,” is “being used and developed at the moment to empower corporations and governments against workers and citizens.”⁶ If the deployment of artificial intelligence remains on this trajectory, in Acemoglu’s view, it will likely “produce various social, economic and political harms. These include damaging competition, consumer privacy and consumer choice; excessively automating work, fueling inequality, inefficiently pushing down wages, and failing to improve worker productivity; and damaging political discourse, democracy’s most fundamental lifeblood.”

The fracturing of the Left means there is no counterbalancing political force to reroute the thrust of AI more constructively. Beyond that, a weakened economic Left gives the Right what amounts to an open field to shape tax legislation, deregulation, and spending policies favoring the interests of those at the top. From roughly 1968 to the present, policy-making has been driven by the top quintile of the income distribution and by corporate America.

Not only have economic conservatives benefited from a wounded adversary, but the most powerful economic forces—global competition, outsourcing, an accelerating digital revolution, the ability of corporations to move capital and operations across borders—have worked to their advantage, and to the disadvantage of workers.

Liberal theorists have repeatedly called for a wide range of structural reforms, some of which might have spread more evenly the costs and benefits of the ongoing postindustrial upheaval. These include a stronger safety net; a higher minimum wage; expanded health care, childcare, and prescription drug coverage; more generous provision for the disabled and the aged; sharply increased spending on worker training (especially in community colleges); tax reform; trade policies with worker protections; and a complete revision of the National Labor Relations Act to account for globalization and robotization. No matter what their merits, these options have not had a chance while the balance of economic power has been tilted so far to the right.

The labor-left Economic Policy Institute, in *The State of Working America*, correctly points to the growing tension between wages and productivity:

A key feature of the labor market since 1973—one that was not present in prior decades—has been the stunning disconnect between the economy's potential for improved pay and the reality of stunted pay growth, especially since 2000. Productivity grew 80.4 percent between 1973 and 2011, when, as noted, median worker pay grew just 10.7 percent. Since 2000, productivity has grown 22.8 percent, but real compensation has stagnated across the board, creating the largest divergence between productivity and pay in the last four decades. Stagnant wage and benefit growth has not been due to poor overall economic performance; nor has it been inevitable. Rather, wage and benefit growth stagnated because the economy, as structured by the rules in place, no longer ensures that workers' pay rises in tandem with productivity.⁷

The question remains: Why do the contemporary rules of the economy not ensure pay raises in proportion to improved productivity?

There are global forces beyond national reach driving some of these trends, but insofar as the rules are set domestically, the issue is political power. And at the moment, those who would benefit from policies encouraging shared rewards from growing productivity are split between two political parties, unable to effectively promote their material interests.

Evidence of the shift in emphasis from economic to cultural politics can be found in the contrast between voting in some of the nation's poorest white counties, on the one hand, and voting in affluent suburbs, on the other. Take 96.2 percent white McDowell County, West Virginia, where the median household income in 2020 was \$25,997, compared with the national median of \$67,340, and the poverty rate was 31.9 percent, compared with a national rate of 11.9 percent. In 1964, the county voted 83 percent to 17 percent for Lyndon Johnson over Barry Goldwater. In 2020, the county voted 78.9 percent to 20.4 percent for Trump over Joe Biden. Or take the entire state of West Virginia, which ranks forty-sixth in median household income. In 1964, fifty-one of the state's fifty-five counties voted Democratic. In 2020 and 2016, all fifty-five of the state's counties cast majorities for Trump.

In the 2020 election, nine of the ten counties in the United States with the highest median household income voted for Biden, including all of the top five, Loudon and Fairfax Counties in Virginia, Santa Clara and San Mateo Counties in California, and Los Alamos County in New Mexico.

The Democratic Party, once the party of working men and women, is currently dominated by issues of race, gender, and sexuality. In recent elections, these issues have overridden economic divisions. State voting patterns are defined by the degree to which residents have entered into what has been called a "second demographic transition" (SDT). This transition, according to Ron J. Lesthaeghe, of the Vrije Universiteit of Brussels, has two components: "The *first* principal component or factor describes typical SDT features such as the postponement of marriage, greater prevalence of cohabitation and same-sex households, postponement of parenthood, sub-replacement fertility, and a higher incidence of abortion. By contrast,

the *second* principal component captures the family variables that generally lead to greater vulnerability of young women and children, such as teenage marriage and fertility, subsequent divorce, single-parent households, and children residing in the households of grandparents.”⁸

Lesthaeghe elaborates further: “The SDT starts in the 1960s with a series of multifaceted revolutions. First, there was the contraceptive revolution, with the introduction of hormonal contraception and far more efficient IUDs; second, there was the sexual revolution, with declining ages at first sexual intercourse; and third, there was the gender revolution, questioning the sole breadwinner household model and the gendered division of labor that accompanied it.”⁹

This demographic transition has transformed the Democratic Party, transferring agenda-setting power to the knowledge class. And this ascendant constituency is most concerned with protecting and advancing recently democratized rights—notably reproductive rights, the right to privacy, and women’s rights—as well as a comprehensive commitment to cultural, ethnic, and racial diversity.

These trends were apparent as early as the 1996 presidential campaign when two of Bill Clinton’s top advisers, Dick Morris and Mark Penn, reported that one of the most effective ways of predicting voter behavior was from answers to five questions: Do you believe homosexuality is morally wrong? Do you ever personally look at pornography? Would you look down on someone who had an affair while married? Do you believe sex before marriage is morally wrong? Is religion very important in your life?

How did this come about?

Figures 0.1 and 0.2 compare the elections of 1976 (between two centrist candidates, Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford) and 2016 (pitting Donald Trump against Hillary Clinton). The horizontal axis measures the percentage of each state’s vote cast for the Republican candidates (including Evan McMullin in 2016), and the vertical axis measures the degree to which the population of a given state has entered the SDT.¹⁰




FIGURE 0.1. Vote for Gerald Ford in 1976.

In this country, individual states have moved into the SDT at very different rates. Those rates have, in turn, become increasingly correlated with how each state votes in presidential elections. What figure 0.1 shows is that as recently as 1976, the correlation between a state’s ranking in the SDT and its partisanship in presidential elections was modest at best. States are scattered all over the plot. A host of states from Massachusetts to Utah are nonconforming outliers, placed far from the axis.

Figure 0.2 shows how, in a matter of forty years, the SDT becomes powerfully correlated with state voting. Instead of the scattergram seen in figure 0.1, the states in 2016 form a neat line along the axis, with virtually no deviance from the overall pattern.

In many respects, Lesthaeghe’s SDT can be linked to the emergence of “postmaterialism” and the value of self-expressive individualism, first described by the late Ronald Inglehart, professor of political science at the University of Michigan, in his 1971 paper




FIGURE 0.2. Relationship between the SDT factor and the vote for Trump and McMullin in 2016, US 50 states ($r = -.909$).

Source: Ron J. Lesthaeghe and Lisa Neidert, “Spatial Aspects of the American ‘Culture War’: The Two Dimensions of US Family Demography and the Presidential Elections, 1968–2016.” From *The New York Times*. © 2017 The New York Times Company. All rights reserved. Used under license.

“The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-industrial Societies.”¹¹ In three subsequent books, *The Silent Revolution* (1977), *Culture Shift* (1989), and *Cultural Evolution* (2018), Inglehart described the movement to postmaterialism, which included the following:

- “[A] shift in child-rearing values, from emphasis on hard work toward emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child.”
- “An environment of trust and tolerance, in which people place a relatively high value on individual freedom and have

- activist political orientations—attributes that, the political culture literature has long argued, are crucial to democracy.”
- “[A] shift away from deference to all forms of external authority. Submission to authority has high costs: the individual’s personal goals must be subordinated to those of others.”
 - “Tolerance of diversity and rising demands [among citizens] to have a say in what happens to them.”
 - “[The young are] more tolerant of homosexuality than their elders, and they are more favorable to gender equality and more permissive in their attitudes toward abortion, divorce, extramarital affairs, and euthanasia.”
 - “The feminization of society and declining willingness to fight for one’s country.”
 - “[A] systematic erosion of religious practices, values and beliefs.”¹²

When Lesthaeghe and Inglehart first explored the SDT and post-materialist values, an underlying assumption was that these were beneficent trends reflecting growing affluence: that as scarcity diminished, new generations would inevitably shift their focus from economic survival to matters of lifestyle—including the environment and the breakdown of racial and gender barriers. In the words of Inglehart and Pippa Norris, a professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School, in their 2017 paper, “Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: *The Silent Revolution* in Reverse,” “During the postwar era, the people of developed countries experienced peace, unprecedented prosperity and the emergence of advanced welfare states, making survival more secure than ever before. Postwar birth cohorts grew up taking survival for granted, bringing an intergenerational shift toward Postmaterialist values.”¹³

In the mid-1970s, however, the postwar era of sustained, shared growth came to a halt, and the liberal order, and the economic security that accompanied it, began to fray. As foreign producers became competitive, globalization started to impose costs on American corporations and workers. Instead of shared prosperity, median salaries

stagnated while those at the top grew rapidly, driving new levels of inequality. A high school diploma lost its status as a sufficient credential for a middle-class job. Before long, big-box stores (Walmart, Target, and Costco) and, by the turn of the century, online commerce (Amazon) had begun to devastate small businesses and to decimate small towns.

Faced with growing challenges at home and abroad, American corporations abandoned paternalistic employment policies that carried the implicit promise of employment for life; the corporate view of unions changed from ally to adversary, with worker demands seen as leading to dangerous increases in bottom-line costs.

By the late 1970s, with the emergence of simultaneous inflation and stagnation—“stagflation”—and the threat to American industry from abroad, corporate America, joined by an ascendant conservative political movement, produced a powerful antitax, antiregulatory movement. In order to regain strength in a globally competitive environment, business abandoned past obligations to workers, the state, and the community. Environmental and workplace safety rules, seniority protection, unions, pensions, health insurance, and loyalty to workers were abruptly viewed as unsustainable costs that allowed European and Asian companies to undercut domestic producers.

These shifts in corporate employment policies coincided with a massive surge in immigration to the United States following the liberalizing policies of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. For Trump, it was a simple matter to focus native discontent on the surge in foreign-born low-wage workers competing for jobs and—in the view of his partisans—transforming American culture.

The net effect of the two revolutions that have dominated American society for the past five decades—first, the social and cultural revolution, and second, the technological and economic revolution that transformed employment, corporate business models, and market expectations—imposed what was often viewed as a survival-of-the-fittest ethos on the working and middle classes. Members of the upper-middle class survived and often prospered under the new sink-or-swim regime, but the less well-off, especially those without

college degrees, were ill-equipped to cope. It was at this stage that many liberals and the Democratic Party became preoccupied with the expanding cultural revolution, the plight of minorities, and various manifestations of identity politics, effectively forsaking the past commitment to class politics that had animated the Left through the New Deal and Fair Deal eras.

Emerging social-cultural movements—rooted in racial, sexual, religious, and gender, as opposed to class, identities—produced a series of conservative and right-wing countercultural revolutions over the course of the next five decades. These included Nixon’s silent majority, the Christian Right, the Reagan Democrats, the angry white men, and the Tea Party and culminated most recently in the Trump Revolution. Each development was opposed, in part or in whole, to a greater or lesser degree, to the temper of the SDT, to postmaterialist values, to racial and ethnic diversity, to secularization, to reproductive rights, and to rapidly transforming gender roles.

The Republican Party capitalized on the dislocation and conflict generated by rapid cultural modernization, exploiting “wedge” issues like abortion and gay marriage which pushed voters’ “anger points” and motivated turnout.

In the conservative-wave elections of 1980, 1994, 2010, and 2014, postmaterialism, noted Inglehart and Norris, “became its own gravedigger.”¹⁴ As liberalism shifted from advocacy on behalf of the economic have-nots to an agenda of racial integration and personal fulfillment, policies of redistribution, legal protection of unions, and the defense of the material interests of the working class were subordinated. “This, plus large immigration flows from low-income countries with different cultures and religions, stimulated a reaction in which much of the working class moved to the right, in defense of traditional values,” wrote Inglehart and Norris. “The classic economic issues did not disappear. But their relative prominence declined to such an extent that non-economic issues became more prominent than economic ones in Western political parties’ campaign platforms.”¹⁵ For white working-class voters experiencing lost jobs, the hegemony of alien cultures, and the steady deterioration

of their communities, the new, value-laden, antimaterialist liberal agenda amounted to an insult.

Ironically, these trends, which benefit Democrats, are arguably also fostering inequality. The late Princeton sociologist Sara McLanahan, in “Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring under the Second Demographic Transition,” wrote that while children “born to the most-educated women are gaining resources, in terms of parents’ time and money, those who were born to the least-educated women are losing resources. The forces behind these changes include feminism, new birth control technologies, changes in labor market opportunities, and welfare-state policies. I contend that Americans should be concerned about the growing disparity in parental resources and that the government can do more to close the gap between rich and poor children.”¹⁶

As sociocultural and identity issues displace an ideology based on economic class, not only do the incentives for liberalism and the Democratic Party to address class-based problems of mobility and inequality diminish, but the center-left becomes vulnerable to economic special-interest pressures. Lobbies and trade associations focused on the legislative process as a means to commercial goals—tax breaks, regulatory change, subsidies, and so forth—can more readily apply pressure through campaign contributions and grassroots mobilization to members of the House and Senate who lack a broad ideological commitment to those in the bottom three quintiles of the income distribution. In a parallel development, Democratic incumbents have become increasingly dependent on the votes of the affluent to win elections, making these politicians reluctant to threaten the interests of their upscale constituents.

There are few better examples of Democratic susceptibility to special-interest pressure than the continued preservation of the carried interest tax break through four years of Democratic control of Congress—from 2006 to 2010 and again after the 2020 election. The carried interest break provides an estimated \$18 billion annually to wealthy hedge fund operators and beneficiaries of investment funds.¹⁷

For a Democrat seeking election, the easiest path to capitalize on Republican social and moral extremism had been to stress threats to reproductive rights, to the teaching of evolution, to gay marriage, and to the protection of transgender people. In many respects, this was until recently a successful strategy: in seven of the last eight presidential elections, the Democratic candidate has won the popular vote.¹⁸

As the January 2021 insurrection in the US Capitol and the relentless, ongoing Republican efforts to have Trump illegitimately declared the winner of the 2020 election demonstrate, however, Democrats now face Republican adversaries who are determined not only to pare back the liberal state but to sabotage democracy itself, to overturn the will of the voters, to overthrow majority control, and to attack the legitimacy of election outcomes, undermining the very essence of American democracy.

At the same time, the Democratic Party's shift to postmaterialist values has left millions of white working-class voters with no perceived choice except the Republican Party.

For Republicans, the prospect of losing has become what political scientists describe as a "normative threat"¹⁹—a danger to the moral order underpinning society. Many liberals and Democrats saw and see Trump and the Republican Party as a fully comparable existential threat. Victory for the opposition, in each case, raises the specter of moral collapse.



There has been a precipitous and accelerating decline of the United States on measures of freedom and democracy. From 2010 to 2020 Freedom House, which ranks countries based on an analysis of the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, the functioning of the government, freedom of expression and of belief, associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights,²⁰ demoted the United States from seventh worldwide to eighteenth, just below Croatia, Argentina, and

Romania. “The erosion of US democracy is remarkable, especially for a country that has long aspired to serve as a beacon of freedom for the world,” the authors of the Freedom House study reported. “The downward trend accelerated considerably over the last four years, as the Trump administration trampled institutional and normative checks on its authority, cast aside safeguards against corruption, and imposed harsh and discriminatory policies governing immigration and asylum.”²¹

In a ranking by the *Economist* magazine,²² the United States fell from sixteenth in 2006 to twenty-sixth in 2020, “based on five categories: *electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties.*” The United States was described as a “flawed democracy”—as opposed to a full democracy. Twenty-two countries achieved “full democracy” status, led by Norway, New Zealand, and Finland. Among the fifty-three flawed democracies, the United States ranked just below France, Israel, Spain, and Chile, and just above Estonia and Portugal.

These downward trends culminated in Trump’s election in 2016 and, despite his defeat in 2020, in his continuing power over a majority of Republican voters.



The collection that follows of *New York Times* opinion columns from 2015 onward provides a real-time account of how and why Trump managed to prevail and an enlarged understanding of the forces that enabled his rise. The Trump era is not over yet—forewarned is forearmed.²³

INDEX OF NAMES

- Abramowitz, Alan, 59, 100, 235–36, 238
Acemoglu, Daron, 5, 37, 129, 131–32, 135–36, 193, 324–25
Achen, Christopher, 117, 121
Adams, John, 265–67
Adams, John Quincy, 267
Alesina, Alberto F., 173–74, 176
Algara, Carlos, 208–09
Allport, Gordon, 167–68, 360
Alstadsæter, Annette, 194
Anderson, Cameron, 304
Ansolabehere, Stephen, 60, 143–44
Anton, Michael, 234
Argyle, Lisa, 313
Asthana, Ankur, 259
Atari, Mohammad, 391
Autor, David: automation, 161; China trade and, 36, 134; economic problems, 129; gender gap, 368–69, 371–74; industries' market share, 190, 194; populist Right, 135–37; single-parent households, 123; wage inequality, 341–42, 347

Bacon, Perry, Jr., 335–36
Bail, Christopher, 316–17
Balkin, Jack, 315
Barber, Michael, 116–18, 120–21
Bargh, John A., 223
Barkai, Simcha, 192–93
Barr, Andy, 173
Barr, William, 257
Barrett, Amy Coney, 258
Bartels, Larry, 117, 121
Batra, Raghav, 398
Bauer, Bob, 284
Baxley, Paul, 300
Begala, Paul, 229
Beinart, Peter, 112
Belcher, Cornell, 251
Bell, Daniel, 95

Bellafante, Ginia, 48
Benkler, Yochai, 314
Bernstein, Jared, 39–40
Bertrand, Marianne, 367–68
Biden, Joseph R.: Black voters and, 243, 249, 278; Congress and, 291; continuity of government, 266, 270; Democratic coalition, 272, 277, 280, 376; election of 2020, 7, 250, 255, 258, 264, 286, 357, 377; Electoral College and, 267; federal budget request, 329; Trump and, 256, 262, 283, 309; working-class vote, 383
Billings, Stephen, 359
Bischoff, Kendra, 41, 43
Bishop, Bill, 79
Blanchard, Olivier, 347
Bobbitt, Philip, 270–71
Bobo, Lawrence, 216
Bonikowski, Bart, 303
Booker, Corey, 202
Bouie, Jamelle, 215, 381–82
Boxell, Levi, 392
Brandt, Mark J., 389, 398–99
Brinke, Leanne ten, 304
Broockman, David E., 116, 121
Brooks, Alison Wood, 368
Bruni, Frank, 62
Brynjolfsson, Erik, 81–82, 160
Bryson, Joanna, 396–97
Buckley, William F., 1–2
Buell, Ryan W., 174
Buffett, Warren, 193
Bullock, Steve, 82
Burden, Barry, 256
Burger, Warren, 49
Burlein, Ann, 299
Burns, Alexander, 111, 202, 357
Bush, George H. W., 46, 79, 225, 268
Bush, George W., 26, 38, 66, 215, 246, 268

412 INDEX OF NAMES

- Buss, David, 124–25
Butler, Daniel M., 116
- Cain, Bruce, 277
Campbell, David, 301
Campbell, James T., 268–69
Campbell, Simone, 300
Campolo, Tony, 300
Cappelli, Peter, 159
Card, David, 51, 129
Carey, John, 138
Carrell, Scott E., 360
Carter, Jimmy, 20, 228, 268
Carville, James, 337
Case, Anne, 77–79
Castro, Julián, 202, 208
Caughey, Devin, 400
Chait, Jonathan, 64
Cherlin, Andrew, 303
Chetty, Raj, 345
Chong, Dennis, 385–86
Chyn, Eric, 359, 361–62
Citrin, Jack, 385–86
Cleveland, Grover, 267
Clinton, Bill, 20–22, 201
Clinton, Hillary: Biden and, 377, 383; Black voters and, 217, 245–46, 251; college-educated voters and, 27; demographic constituency of, 102, 109, 111, 327; deplorables comment, 277; election of 2016, 23, 26, 74, 79, 86, 249; liberal voters and, 149, 163; Obama and, 112; primary voters and, 28, 47–48; Trump and, 207, 269; Trump debate, 62; truthfulness, 65
Coaston, Jane, 357
Cobb, Adam, 155
Cochrane, Emily, 266
Corbyn, Jeremy, 108–09
Cowan, Jonathan, 150, 152
Cramer, Katherine, 69
Crawford, Jarrett, 398–99
Cruz, Ted, 40, 269–70, 350
- Damhuis, Koen, 110
Daruich, Diego, 345
Davis, Julie Hirschfeld, 187
Deaton, Angus, 77–79
De Bolle, Marleen, 371
Decter-Frain, Ari, 398
Deming, David, 125–26
Devine, Tad, 48
Diamond, Larry, 255
Ditto, Peter, 289, 387
- Doepke, Matthias, 342–45
Dolan, Kathleen, 140
Dorn, David, 36
Dowe, Pearl K., 248–49
Druckman, James N., 235
Drutman, Lee, 25–26, 151, 187–88
Dukakis, Michael, 46
Dunham, James, 400
- Emmer, Tom, 275
Enders, Adam, 353–54, 373–74
Engelen, Ewald, 107
Engelhardt, Andrew, 236–37
Enos, Ryan, 163–70, 203, 229
- Fandos, Nicholas, 266
Farinella, Marc, 276
Farooqui, Anusar, 227–28
Federico, Christopher, 306–07
Figlio, David, 371
Finkel, Eli, 287–88
Fiske, Alan Page, 306
Flaherty, Colleen, 369
Foa, Roberto Stefan, 90
Foley, Edward B., 253–55, 258, 261, 265
Foner, Eric, 267
Ford, Bryan, 319–20
Ford, Gerald, 268
Frank, Robert, 315–16
Franklin, Sekou, 249
Freeman, Richard, 125
Frey, William, 54
Fryer, Roland, 344
Fuentes, Nick, 287
- Galston, William, 323–24
Geary, David C., 124, 391
Geismer, Lily, 163
Gellman, Barton, 254–55, 257
Gentzkow, Matthew, 392
Gessen, Masha, 64, 69
Ghitza, Yair, 376
Gienapp, Jonathan, 263
Gingrich, Newt, 21, 264
Gino, Francesca, 368
Giuliano, Paola, 173
Glaeser, Edward L., 174, 176
Glynn, Adam N., 355
Goldberg, Jonah, 64
Goldberg, Zach, 145–47, 181, 184–86
Goldin, Claudia, 341
Goldman, Seth, 361–62
Goldstone, Jack, 285–86, 290

- Goldwater, Barry, 2, 7, 225, 264
Goodstein, Scott, 84
Gorski, Philip, 296–97
Gourevitch, Nick, 149
Graham, Carol, 305
Graham, Jesse, 58–59, 61, 387
Graham, Lindsey, 65, 267
Grandin, Greg, 268
Greenberg, Stanley, 22–24, 225–27, 231–32
Greene, Samuel, 86, 88
Griffin, Robert, 391
Grofman, Bernard, 277, 310–11
Grossmann, Matt, 152, 219, 230
Grzymala-Busse, Anna, 92
Guellec, Dominique, 194
Guiso, Luigi, 97
- Haggag, Kareem, 359
Haidt, Jonathan, 57–59, 61, 337, 387
Hale, Isaac, 208–9
Halpern, Diane, 339
Halpin, John, 377, 379–80
Hamel, Brian T., 362
Hanania, Richard, 390
Hanson, Gordon, 36–37, 129
Hanushek, Eric A., 346
Harmon, Steve, 295
Harris, Kamala, 202, 208
Harrison, Benjamin, 267
Hart, David M., 77
Hartig, Hannah, 376
Hasen, Richard, 191, 255–56
Hawkins, Stephen, 183
Hayden, Michael V., 66
Heckman, James, 344–45
Helmke, Gretchen, 138–39
Hendren, Nathaniel, 345
Herrera, Helios, 97
Hersh, Eitan, 280
Hetherington, Marc, 66, 231
Hickenlooper, John, 82
Hindman, Matthew, 83
Hirsch, Jeffrey, 158–60
Hochschild, Arlie, 369–70
Hoekstra, Mark, 360
Hofer, Norbert, 110
Hoover, Herbert, 268
Hopkins, Daniel, 169, 361–62, 364
Howe, Paul, 93–94
Huang, Julie, 223
Huddy, Leonie, 173, 238, 387–89
Hughes, Scottie Nell, 67
Humphrey, Hubert, 20
- Hunter, Ivan Harrison, 260
Hutchings, Vincent L., 248
- Igjelnik, Ruth, 376
Illing, Sean, 337
Inglehart, Ronald, 9–11, 13, 94–95, 222, 224
Inslee, Jay, 82
Issacharoff, Samuel, 85–86
Iyengar, Shanto, 141, 234–35, 288–89
Iyer, Ravi, 387
- Jacobs, Emily G., 308
Jacobson, Gary, 229, 250, 287
Jardina, Ashley, 216
Jargowsky, Paul A., 52, 54
Jefferson, Thomas, 265–66
Jeffress, Robert, 297
Jensen, Frances E., 370
Johannesen, Niels, 194
Johnson, Lyndon, 7, 20
Johnson, Richard, 267
Jones, Robert P., 115, 244–45, 295, 298, 300–301
Joseph, Craig, 386
Jost, John, 59
Judis, John, 26
Jungherr, Andreas, 86
Junn, Jane Yunhee, 308
- Kaepernick, Colin, 278
Kalmoe, Nathan, 238
Kane, John V., 350–52
Karabarbounis, Loukas, 34
Karbownik, Krzysztof, 371
Kasich, John, 26, 32
Katz, Lawrence, 158–59, 341, 345
Keeter, Scott, 376
Kelly, Megyn, 62
Keltner, Dacher, 304
Kendi, Ibram X., 377–78, 380
Kennedy, John F., 20
Kennedy, Randall, 338–39
Kenworthy, Lane, 375
Kerry, John, 246
Kessler, Glenn, 64–65
Kew, Darren, 277–78
Kilgore, Ed, 24–25, 336
Kimball, Charles, 295
Kinsley, Michael, 64
Kitschelt, Herbert P., 309
Klein, Ezra, 381–2
Kloppenber, James T., 263–64
Koleva, Spassena, 387
Korinek, Anton, 328–29

414 INDEX OF NAMES

- Kraus, Michael, 308
Krueger, Alan, 155, 157–59, 161
Kulkarni, Siddharth, 77
Kuziemko, Ilyana, 174
- Laird, Chryl N., 247
Lake, Celinda, 150
Lassiter, Matthew D., 163
Lee, Frances E., 334
Leege, David, 124
Lefgren, Lars, 176
Lelkes, Yphtach, 196, 238
Leonhardt, David, 149, 217
Le Pen, Marine, 95, 107, 110
Lesthaeghe, Ron J., 7–9, 11, 30, 32–33, 101–2
Levi, Margaret, 92–93
Levinson, Sanford, 405
Levitz, Eric, 230–31
Levy, Morris, 385–86
Lewandowski, Corey, 67
Lichter, Daniel T., 54
Lundberg, Shelly, 347–48, 374
Luntz, Frank, 60
Lupia, Arthur, 100
Lynerd, Benjamin, 298
- Macron, Emmanuel, 108, 110–11
MacWilliams, Matthew C., 67
Malone, Clare, 90
Manchin, Joe, 277, 402
Mann, Horace, 340
Mare, Robert D., 306
Marti, Gerardo, 296
Martin, Jonathan, 111, 202
Mas, Alexandre, 51
Mason, Lilliana, 168, 234, 238, 349–52
Massie, Thomas, 173
McAfee, Andrew, 81–82, 160
McCain, John, 46, 65–66, 96, 225, 231
McCarty, Nolan, 393, 396–97
McCluskey, Martha, 156
McConnell, Mitch, 66, 120, 171, 186, 283, 286
McCoy, Jennifer, 394–95, 401
McDaniel, Jason, 107
McElwee, Sean, 44, 107
McGovern, George, 20
McLanahan, Sara, 14
McWhorter, John, 250–51
Merriman, Hardy, 259
Messing, Solomon, 196
Mettler, Suzanne, 172–73
Miller, Paul D., 298
- Morelli, Massimo, 97
Morgan, G. Scott, 305–6
Morris, Dick, 8
Motta, Matthew P., 355
Mounk, Yascha, 90, 94, 96, 186, 226
Mousa, Salma, 360
Moyn, Samuel, 268
Mueller, Robert S., 141, 143
Mulvaney, Mick, 177
Muro, Mark, 77, 220–22, 326
Murphy, Tim, 99
Mutz, Diana, 289–90
- Nail, Paul, 222–23
Napier, Jaime L., 223
Navid, Marium, 260
Neidert, Lisa, 30, 32–33, 101–2
Newman, Benjamin J., 363–64
Nixon, Richard, 13, 20, 92, 102, 201, 268, 355
Norquist, Grover, 47
Norris, Pippa, 11, 13
Norton, Michael I., 174
Nosek, Brian A., 387
Nunn, Ryan, 191
Nyhan, Brendan, 138
- Obama, Barack: affirmative action and, 378; Biden and, 251; bipartisanship, 20, 337; election of, 23, 84; Hillary Clinton and, 112; housing crisis and, 310; liberal policies of, 229; Obamacare and, 39; racial attitudes and, 149, 206–7, 266; student support, 47; voters for, 27–28, 46, 74, 79, 143, 166, 228, 246, 327; working-class losses and, 60
Ocasio-Cortez, Alexandria, 199, 272, 275–76, 402
Omar, Ilhan, 199
Ooi, Bea-Sim, 363–64
Orfield, Myron, 50, 53
Ornstein, Norman J., 38
Orwell, George, 65
- Pan, Jessica, 367–68
Pandya, Sachin S., 157
Parisi, Domenico, 54
Park, Justin, 62
Parker, Christopher Sebastian, 356–57
Patrick, Stewart, 107, 110
Paunov, Caroline, 194
Pelosi, Nancy, 255, 279
Pence, Mike, 255

- Penn, Mark, 8
Perkins, Tony, 295
Perry, Samuel L., 293–94, 299
Perry, Samuel P., 299
Persily, Nathaniel, 40, 84, 119, 257–58, 312–13, 317–20
Peterson, Erik, 235–36, 288
Peterson, Paul E., 346
Phillips, Steve, 383
Philpot, Tasha, 214–15
Pildes, Richard, 256
Pinker, Steven, 153, 290
Pinto, Sergio, 305
Plotkin, Joshua B., 396
Podesta, John, 86
Podhorzer, Michael, 279
Polakow-Suransky, Sasha, 90
Pope, Jeremy C., 116–18, 120–21
Porter, Eduardo, 68
Posner, Eric, 155, 161
Press, Benjamin, 394–95, 401
Pressley, Ayanna, 199
Priebus, Reince, 23
Przeworski, Adam, 91–92

Quasem, Mayesha, 391

Rai, Tage Shakti, 306
Raskin, Abraham Henry, 168
Rastogi, Ankit, 365
Rauch, Jonathan, 233, 237
Reagan, Ronald, 2, 21, 264, 268
Reardon, Sean F., 41, 43
Reeves, Andrew, 44–45, 144–45
Reeves, Richard, 44–45
Reich, Taly, 174
Reny, Tyler Thomas, 363–64
Restrepo, Pascual, 131–32
Richeson, Jennifer, 307
Roberts, John G., Jr., 258
Roberts, Margaret, 313
Rodden, Jonathan, 272–73
Rodrik, Dani, 68, 280–81, 327, 347
Rogers, Joel, 21
Rogowski, Jon C., 100–101, 144–45
Romney, Mitt, 19, 23, 47, 74, 134, 246
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 144, 224, 264, 314
Rose, Elizabeth, 333
Rosenthal, Howard, 143
Roth, Jeffrey, 371
Rothstein, Jesse, 51
Rubio, Marco, 26, 40, 136
Ruch, Alexander, 398

Rutte, Mark, 109
Ryan, Paul, 120

Saad, Lydia, 180, 207
Sabato, Larry, 196
Sampson, Robert, 46
Sanders, Bernie, 47–48, 84, 87, 111, 243, 249, 251, 275
Sawhill, Isabel, 228
Schaller, Mark, 62
Schelling, Thomas, 50–51
Schnurer, Eric B., 316
Schore, Allan, 126–27
Schwartz, Christine R., 306
Sears, David O., 362–63, 365–66
Shah, Kifah, 260
Shah, Rushi, 334
Shambaugh, Jay, 191–92
Shapiro, Jesse M., 392
Shapiro, Robert Y., 142
Shils, Edward, 334
Shirky, Clay, 87–88
Shor, David, 381–82
Shropshire, Adrianne, 243, 247
Sidanius, Jim, 60, 62
Sides, John, 30, 168–69, 391
Silver, Nate, 136
Sinha, Manisha, 266
Skitka, Linda J., 305–6
Slothuus, Rune, 235
Smeeding, Timothy, 43
Smith, Candis Watts, 211
Snyder, Timothy, 96
Sorrenti, Giuseppe, 342, 344
Spaeth, Ryu, 333
Spanberger, Abigail, 274–75
Spross, Jeff, 81–82
Starr, Evan, 157
Stenner, Karen, 112
Stephens-Dougan, LaFleur, 216
Stewart, Alexander J., 396–97
Stewart, Katherine, 293–94
Stiglitz, Joseph E., 328–29
Stoet, Gijsbert, 391
Stokes, Susan, 138
Strossen, Nadine, 333
Strother, Dane, 276–77
Stutzman, Rob, 68

Tabas, Lawrence, 254–55
Taft, William Howard, 268
Talpey, Laura M., 346
Taquino, Michael C., 54

416 INDEX OF NAMES

- Tate, Katherine, 212
Teixeira, Ruy, 20–21, 26, 377–78
Tesler, Michael, 28–30, 149, 168–69, 176, 203, 205–7, 391
Theocharis, Yannis, 314
Theodoridis, Alex, 142, 237
Tinbergen, Jan, 342
Tlaib, Rashida, 199, 275
Trumka, Richard, 279
Trump, Donald, 245, 244; Adams comparison, 266; alt-right and, 94; anti-immigration and, 170, 187, 189–90; appointees, 161; authoritarianism of, 17, 57, 59, 61, 67, 92, 139, 219, 269, 353; Black voters and, 243–44, 247–52; campaign and, 84, 91, 99, 162, 243–44, 248–49, 252, 284, 298; China trade and, 36; Christian nationalism and, 298, 300–301; corruption and, 16, 280; COVID-19 response, 356; democracy and, 90, 96, 139, 263–65, 270, 404; Democratic opposition, 152, 208, 213, 382; demographic constituency of, 133–34, 136, 246, 374, 377; economy and, 142–144, 220–22, 224, 228; effect on politics, 358; election of 2020, 241, 253–54; election of 2020 defeat, 262, 267–68, 271, 283; election of 2020 lies, 255, 257–59, 261, 287, 290; election results, 7, 16, 23, 26, 65, 134, 136; Electoral College and, 255; evangelicals and, 116; fascist, 64; focus on disgust, 62; and Hillary Clinton, 27–28, 269; immigration and, 3, 12; insurrection and, 15, 297, 302–3, 305, 311; issues and, 117–18, 218; Latinos and, 169, 174, 364, 383; liberal voters and, 163, 182, 207, 310; lies of, 64–65, 67–69, 89, 97, 140–41, 269–70, 280; midterm election and, 129; moderates and, 231; and Nancy Pelosi, 279; nationalism and, 107; partisans, 3, 12, 65, 103, 241, 248, 353–54; persuadable voters and, 239; popularity of, 58–61, 63, 98–101, 105, 119–20; progressives and, 226; racism and, 150, 186, 202, 231; Republican Party and, 16–17, 40, 229, 277, 350–52, 357–58, 405; rural voters, 162; Russia and, 65–66, 69, 86, 249; Rust Belt and, 24; social media and, 313, 315, 336; social safety net and, 230; voter support, 27–28, 29f, 30, 32–33, 69, 71, 74–75, 79, 102, 111; white nationalists and, 307; white supremacists and, 1, 8, 147–49, 245, 349, 355; women and, 127, 196, 376; working class and, 136, 326–27
Trump, Ivanka, 127
Tucker, Joshua, 318–19
Turchin, Peter, 285–86, 290
Turner, Margery Austin, 52
Uscinski, Joseph, 350, 353–54
Utych, Stephen M., 203–5
Vaccari, Cristian, 87
Van Buren, Martin, 267
Van der Bellen, Alexander, 109–10
Vavreck, Lynn, 168–69
Vermeulen, Ben, 329
Voelkel, Jan G., 389
Vonasch, Andrew J., 223
Waldman, Paul, 97
Wallace, George, 20, 150, 355
Walsh, Andrew, 260
Wang, Cynthia Shih-Chia, 288–89
Warren, Elizabeth, 208
Warshaw, Christopher, 400–401
Wasow, Omar, 355
Wasserman, Melanie, 369, 371–73
Webster, Steven W., 100, 234–36, 238, 255–56, 355–56
Weil, David, 158
Wertheimer, Fred, 230
West, James E., 360
Westwood, Sean, 196
Wexler, Chuck, 260
White, Ismail K., 247
Whitehead, Andrew L., 291, 299
Whiton, Jacob, 220–22
Wilcox-Archuleta, Bryan, 362
Wilentz, Sean, 264–66
Wilkinson, Frank, 266
Willmann, Johanna, 387–89
Wilmuth, Caroline Ashley, 368
Wilson, William Julius, 375
Woessmann, Ludger, 346
Wronski, Julie, 273, 350–52, 387
Zhang, Junfu, 50–51
Ziblatt, Daniel, 96
Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 342, 344–45
Zingales, Luigi, 193
Zmigrod, Leor, 399–400
Zuboff, Shoshana, 316

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- abortion: Democrats and, 101, 208; knowledge class, 4; legality survey, 212; religious right and, 296; Republicans and, 116, 118, 189, 238, 243; second demographic transition and, 7; wedge issue, 13. *See also* families and children
- “Activating Animus” (Wronski, Mason, Kane), 350
- “The Activation of Prejudice and Presidential Voting” (Hopkins), 364
- affluence, politics of top quartile, social economic stratification, 41, 43, 45–48
- Affordable Care Act (2010), 39, 97–99
- African Americans: candidates and, 202; Christian nationalists, 299; conservative views of, 215; Democratic Party and, 273, 322; education and, 55, 366; employment and, 68, 366; government support for, 174–76; integration and segregation, 49–51, 170, 248, 361, 363; neighborhoods of, 52, 177; racism and racial empathy, 1, 152, 173, 181, 185, 216–17; reparations, 208; Trump and, 243–45, 247–51, 283–84, 349; voters, 47, 149, 207, 211–12, 214
- Ages of Discord* (Turchin), 286
- Al Jazeera*, 107, 110
- “All Our Sons” (Schore), 126
- “America Has Two Economies” (Muro, Whiton), 220
- American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 333, 385
- “The American Color Line and Black Exceptionalism” (Sears), 362, 366
- American Covenant* (Gorski), 296
- American Journal of Political Science*, 116
- American Purpose*, 323
- American Sociological Review*, 54
- America’s Forgotten Majority* (Teixeira, Rogers), 21
- “Anxieties of Democracy” (Issacharoff), 85
- “Architecture of Segregation” (Jargowsky), 52
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, 259
- “Artificial Intelligence, Worker-Replacing Technological Progress and Income Distribution” (Korinek, Stiglitz), 328
- Asian Americans, 68, 218, 226, 326, 363, 365, 376
- Atlantic*, 3, 112, 115, 136, 226, 247, 254–55
- The Authoritarian Dynamic* (Stenner), 112
- authoritarianism, 66–67, 95, 135, 222, 293–94, 318, 388, 398
- “Autocracy” (Gessen), 64
- “Automation Perpetuates the Red-Blue Divide” (Muro), 326
- Autopsy Report (Priebus), 23
- “The Behavioral Immune System” (Schaller, Park), 62
- the Bible, 58
- “Big Other” (Zuboff), 316
- The Big Sort* (Bishop), 79
- bipartisanship, 75, 149, 173, 212, 352, 356, 402
- “The Bitter Heartland” (Galston), 323
- Black Lives Matter, 152, 259–60, 274, 278, 308, 334, 391
- Blacks. *See* African Americans
- “Black Workers in White Places” (Hamel, Wilcox-Archuleta), 362
- Bloodlands* (Snyder), 96
- Boogaloo Bois, 260, 305
- Boston Review*, 324
- Breaking the Social Media Prism* (Bail), 316
- Breitwieser, Audrey, 191
- Bureau of Economic Affairs, 320
- Bush v. Gore* (2000), 256
- campaign finance, 17, 48, 85, 88, 95, 191, 230, 247. *See also* *Citizens United v. FEC*
- “Can American Democracy Survive the Internet?” (Persily), 84

418 INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- cancel culture, 291, 332–33, 335–36
- Capitol Insurrection, 15, 291, 293–96, 299–304, 309, 311, 402
- “The Capitol Siege Recalls Past Acts of Christian Nationalist Violence” (Perry), 299
- “Causal Effect of Intergroup Contact on Exclusionary Attitudes” (Enos), 164
- “The Causal Effects of Elite Position-Taking on Voter Attitudes” (Broockman, Butler), 116
- CBS This Morning*, 111
- center-left coalition, 14, 47, 106, 110, 218, 281, 307, 310
- Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 178
- center-right coalition, 38–39
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 65–66
- Chain Reaction* (Edsall), 3, 209
- Charlottesville Unite the Right, 3, 118–19, 252, 314
- “The China Shock” (Autor, Dorn, Hanson), 36
- China trade, 36–37, 68, 134, 328
- Choosing Democracy, 260
- Christian nationalism, 293–94, 296–301
- Citizens United v. FEC* (2010), 38–39
- Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1, 20, 201
- coded rhetoric, 2, 67, 179, 274, 335, 355
- cognitive and noncognitive skills, 52, 344–48, 368, 398–400
- “The Color of Disparity” (Newman, Ooi, Reny), 363
- Congress: confidence in, 309; control of, 277; elections for, 273, 355, 362; insurrection and, 270, 291, 296, 302, 304–5; Republicans in, 287; voting in, 289, 400
- Conservative but Not Republican* (Philpot), 214
- conservatives: black, 214, 216; civil rights and, 2, 106; corporate America and, 5; economic, 6; evangelical Protestants, 296; family values and, 103f; fear and social change, 223–24; ideology of, 264; prejudice of, 399; purity-disgust appeal, 58, 61–62; racial, 203; right leaning, 188, 222; social, 323; trade and, 134–35; unfair treatment of, 390; voters, 118, 120, 182–83; white, 146, 149, 214. *See also* Republican Party
- conspiracy theories, 289, 295, 303, 311–12, 315–16, 318, 353, 355
- The Constitution of Knowledge* (Rauch), 337
- “The Continuing Increase in Income Segregation” (Reardon), 41, 42f
- corporate America, 12. *See also* globalists and globalization
- The Counterrevolution of Slavery* (Sinha), 266
- COVID-19, 241, 279, 288, 291, 310, 338, 356, 393
- crime and violence: control policies, 143; Democratic position on, 277, 334, 337; motivation for, 303–4, 306, 308; political motivation for, 286; post election, 354–55; Republican position on, 301, 336, 48, 201, 234, 347–48
- critical race theory, 291, 403–4
- “Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization” (Boxell, Gentzkow), 392
- “The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism” (Bell), 95
- Cultural Evolution* (Inglehart), 10
- Culture Shift* (Inglehart), 10
- culture wars, 33, 101, 287, 291, 337
- Daily Princetonian*, 334
- “The Danger of Deconsolidation” (Inglehart), 94
- “The Dangerous Separation of the American Upper Middle Class” (Reeves), 44
- “The Dark Side of Cities” (Spross), 81
- “Declining Labor and Capital Shares” (Barkai), 192
- defund the police, 273–74, 276–78, 311, 332, 334, 337, 382, 404
- deindustrialization, 322, 324, 326–27
- democracy: artificial intelligence and, 325; autocracy or, 138; Christianity and, 298, 300; continuity of government, 270; defense of, 402; diversity and, 167, 294, 307, 353, 359, 394; elections and, 262; peaceful transition, 265–66, 268; polarization of, 394; political discourse and, 5; threats to, 15–16, 26, 92, 96–97, 112, 139, 260, 263–64, 325; trappings of, 83–84; Trump and, 59, 71, 89, 96, 140, 143, 145, 241, 349; trust in, 90–91, 94–95; uncertainty, 85–86; voters and, 117
- Democracy for Realists* (Achen, Bartels), 117, 121
- Democratic Party: affluent liberals of, 227, 382; biracial coalition, 3, 111–12, 375; Black Democrats, 181, 248–49; centrists of, 8, 20, 150, 199, 212, 273–74, 332, 339; civil rights commitment, 20; on climate change, 214; on COVID, 356; cultural politics and, 7; Democratic Socialists, 275; diversity of, 202; election issues, 207; identity politics and, 13–14; left ideology, 151, 163, 276–78, 280, 337; moderates,

- 47, 180, 183, 202, 205, 208, 212–13, 232, 279–80; progressive transformation of, 3–5; racial issues and, 383; rural vulnerability, 69; self-actualization and, 4, 31; social issues, 7, 14, 106, 150–51, 180, 182–83, 186–87, 202, 230, 381; southern states and, 1; special interest pressure, 14; truly advantaged wing, 46–47; Trump effect on, 208; voters and, 21–24, 82, 187, 217, 383. *See also* affluence, politics of top quartile; center-left coalition; post-materialism; progressives; second demographic transition (SDT); voters, white working-class
- Democratic Strategist (website), 24
- “The Democrats’ Four-Year Reprieve” (Rodrik), 280
- demography: China trade and, 134; Democrats and, 231, 403; destabilizing change and, 169, 285, 394; divides of, 313; election results and, 79–80; feminism and, 388; liberals and, 164, 166; Republicans and, 229; of the suburbs, 365; Trump supporters, 77–78. *See also* second demographic transition
- Detroit suburbs, 50, 53–54
- The Diane Rehm Show*, 67
- “Digital Innovation and the Distribution of Income” (Guellec, Paunov), 194
- “Disentangling Race and Individualism” (Jardina), 216
- “Diverging Destinies” (McLanahan), 14
- divorce, 4, 8, 11, 31, 102, 124. *See also* families and children
- “Does Party Trump Ideology?” (Barber, Pope), 116
- “Dynamic Models of Segregation” (Schelling), 50
- Economic Innovation Group, 75
- Economic Policy Institute, 6
- “The Economics of Parenting” (Doepke, Sorrenti, Zilibotti), 342
- Economist* magazine, 16
- economy: capitalism in, 95, 199, 264, 316; conservatives and, 6; digitization of the, 77, 320, 329; elections and, 142–44; employment and, 159; financial crisis and recession, 37–38, 73–75, 95, 369, 393; pandemic and the, 356; polarization and, 397; voters and the, 191, 354
- economy, global, 110, 327, 347
- education: academic achievement, 341, 346, 371; achievement gap, 343; government expenditures on, 345, 347; learning skills, 339, 377; postgraduate degrees, 227, 403
- Education, Skills, and Technical Change* (Lundberg), 348
- “Educational Gender Gaps” (Lundberg), 374
- Education Week*, 360
- “Effect of Ideological Identification” (Voelkel), 389
- “The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children” (Chetty, Hendren, Katz), 345
- election of 2016: black voters in, 245–46; campaign and, 67, 91; digital technology in, 84, 86; education levels, 136–37; financial crisis and recession, 73–75, 131, 228; geographical distribution and, 81; political parties in, 85; popular vote, 65, 69; racial attitudes and, 219; Russian involvement, 65–66, 69, 86, 249; voter affluence and, 111, 162
- election of 2018 (midterm), 142–43, 151–52, 220, 227
- election of 2020: Black voters and, 251, 376; Democratic strategy, 229–31; disputed election, 253–54; election day violence, 260–61; fear of consequences, 234; liberal groups and, 259–60; Pennsylvania legislature and, 254–55, 258; red mirage, 257; refusal to concede, 241, 263–66, 268–69, 289; Trump’s false claims and challenges, 224, 255–56, 258, 283; voters in, 376–77
- elections: exit polls, 25, 46, 136, 182, 243, 301; general election, 27, 47, 92, 136, 204, 208, 217, 219, 248, 259, 276; predictions, 196; primary, 32, 39, 47–48, 136, 212–13
- “The Election That Could Break America” (Gellman), 254
- “The Emergence of Sex Differences in Personality Traits in Early Adolescence” (De Bolle), 371
- The Emerging Democratic Majority* (Teixeira, Judis), 26
- The End of the Second Reconstruction* (Johnson), 267
- Enlightenment Now* (Pinker), 153
- environment and environmental issues, 4, 11–12, 25, 47, 146, 150, 229–30, 281, 334
- Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis* (2018), 157
- “Eroding Norms and Democratic Deconsolidation” (Howe), 93
- ethnocentrism, 26, 29–30, 203
- Europe, 90–93, 97, 106–12, 176, 195, 309, 394

- Expanding Work Requirements in Non-cash Welfare Programs*, 178
- “Extending the Race between Education and Technology” (Autor, Goldin, Katz), 341
- Face the Nation*, 231
- “The Fall of the Labor Share” (Autor), 190
- families and children: diversity and, 362; economics of, 41, 43; education and, 47, 340, 342–44, 347, 361, 378; family structure, 44, 52, 367; father absence, 127, 373; fertility, 7–8, 31, 102, 308; neighborhoods of, 52–53, 55, 345–46; parental investment, 345, 371; single parent households, 8, 123, 127, 368, 371–73. *See also* divorce; gay rights; second demographic transition
- “Family Disadvantage and the Gender Gap” (Autor, Wasserman), 371
- Federal Arbitration Act, 158
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 141–42, 286
- feminism, 4, 14, 387–89, 392
- Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe* (Alesina, Glaeser), 174
- Financial Times*, 109–10
- The Fissured Workplace* (Weil), 158
- FiveThirtyEight, 90, 136, 335
- Forbes* 400, 122
- Foreign Policy*, 25
- Fortune* 500 CEOs, 122
- Fox News Sunday*, 65
- Freedom House, 15–16
- free speech, 139, 209, 323, 337, 385–86
- “Gates, Gaps, and Intergenerational Mobility” (Smeedling), 43
- gay rights, 1, 3–4, 8, 28, 30, 47, 189, 208–9, 243, 308, 311
- gender equality: college-educated voters, 4; Democrats and, 7, 182–83, 232; division of labor, 102; men, employment and family, 122–27; partisan divide, 28; politics and, 391; resentment, 388; SDT and, 8, 30, 33, 386–87; social-cultural movements and, 13; Trump campaign and, 243–44; voters and, 219; women and, 128
- “The Gender-Equality Paradox in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics Education” (Stoet, Geary), 391
- gender gap, 122, 367–74, 377–78, 387
- geographic segregation, 43
- gig economy, 158–59
- globalists and globalization, 6, 11–12, 68, 106, 110–11, 129, 327, 347
- “Global Populisms” (conference), 91
- Go Back to Where You Came From* (Polakow-Suransky), 90
- “The GOP Has Become the Party of Populism” (Drutman), 25
- The Government-Citizen Disconnect* (Mettler), 172–73
- government regulations, 5, 14, 55, 81, 156, 161, 320, 356
- The Growing Diversity of Black America* (Pew), 366
- “The Growing Importance of Social Skills in the Labor Market” (Deming), 125
- A Guide to Defending Democracy* (Merriman, Asthana, Navid, Shah), 259
- guns, 116, 118, 311, 398
- “Harms of AI” (Acemoglu), 5
- Harvard Business Review*, 81
- Hidden Tribes* (Hawkins), 183, 226
- Hispanics and Latinos: Democrats and, 181, 207, 218, 376, 403; education and, 341; employment and, 68; government support for, 174–75; identity as, 4; immigration and, 362–64; integration and, 170; negative attitudes toward, 164–66, 169, 173; neighborhoods of, 52; political correctness and, 226; population of, 178; prejudice and, 364; Republicans and, 23, 168; Trump and, 350, 357; voters, 241, 376–77, 381, 383
- “How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation” (Druckman, Peterson, Slothuus), 235
- “How Political Science Helps Explain the Rise of Trump” (Tesler, Sides), 30
- Identity Crisis* (Sides, Tesler, Vavreck), 168
- identity politics, 13, 120, 298, 378–79, 381, 394
- “Ideological (A)symmetries in Prejudice and Intergroup Bias” (Brandt, Crawford), 398
- “The Ideological Foundations of Affective Polarization in the U.S.” (Webster, Abramowitz), 235
- “The Ideological Nationalization of Partisan Subconstituencies in the American States” (Caughey, Dunham, Warshaw), 400
- immigration: affluent voters on, 111; anti-immigration policies, 166, 169–70, 187, 267, 327; conservatives and, 2, 12–13, 106, 222; Democrats on, 149–50, 152–53, 185–86, 202, 209, 381–82, 391; discontent over, 3; illegal, 58; neighborhood study on, 164–65; partisan divide on, 28, 104,

- 203, 207; populism and, 93; progressives on, 112, 146, 147f; Trump and, 16, 27, 58, 190, 205, 219, 243, 364
- Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 2–3, 12
- “The Impact of Automation on Employment” (Vermeulen), 329
- “The Impact of College Diversity on Behavior toward Minorities” (Carrell, Hoekstra, West), 360
- impeachment, 224, 230, 238
- “Importing Political Polarization?” (Autor), 134
- income distribution, 5, 14, 25, 41, 54, 162, 228, 310, 325
- “In Defense of Cancel Culture” (Rose), 333
- “Individual-Level Cognitive and Personality Predictors of Ideological Worldviews” (Zmigrod), 399
- “Inequality, Identity and Partisanship” (Stewart, Plotkin, McCarty), 396
- Infant Mental Health Journal*, 126
- inflation. *See* economy
- internet, 83–88, 286, 312–14, 317–19
- The Internet’s Challenge to Democracy* (Persily), 312
- Investor’s Business Daily*, 182
- “Is ‘Anti-wokeness’ the New Ideology of the Republican Party?” (Kilgore), 336
- January 2021 insurrection. *See* Capitol Insurrection
- Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees* (2018), 155
- Journal of Black Studies*, 211
- Journal of Democracy*, 90, 93
- Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 222
- Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 50
- knowledge class, 3, 8, 106, 274, 309, 342
- labor: automation and, 5, 37, 99, 131, 133, 136, 161–62, 324–28, 369; bargaining power, 155–58, 161, 190; high-tech jobs, 77, 391; job creation and loss, 13, 34, 68, 76, 122–23, 131, 191–94, 214, 305, 310, 369; noncompete agreements, 157, 161; robotics, 129, 131, 132f, 162; wages and productivity, 6–7, 190, 195. *See also* globalists and globalization
- left ideology. *See* Democratic Party; liberals and liberalism; progressives
- “Left-Wing Policies Aren’t Risky for Democrats” (Levitz), 230
- Lesthaeghe-Neidert scale, 32–33
- “Lethal Mass Partisanship” (Mason), 238
- LGBTQ. *See* gay rights
- liberals, black, 181–83, 214
- liberals, economic, 4
- liberals, racial, 203, 207
- liberals, white, 146, 181, 182f, 183–86, 206, 213, 217, 381, 386
- “Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations” (Graham, Haidt), 61
- liberals and liberalism: backsliding, 154f; cultural revolution and, 13; demographics of, 180; on diversity and immigration, 112; ideology of, 81, 163; nationalists or globalists, 107; structural reforms of, 6, 229; Trump threat, 15, 68, 99, 147, 152, 202; voters, 149
- Liu, Patrick, 191
- Locke, Greg, 294–95
- “The Long-Run Effects of School Racial Diversity on Political Identity” (Billings, Chyn, Haggag), 359
- “Long-Run Trends in the U.S. SES-Achievement Gap” (Hanushek, Peterson, Talpey, Woessmann), 346
- Lopez, German, 135
- López, Ian Haney, 383
- Los Angeles Times*, 68
- “The Macroeconomic Consequences of Early Childhood Development Policies” (Darulich), 345
- “Male Trouble” (Hochschild), 369
- “Man Bites Blue Dog” (Utych), 203
- “Mapping the Moral Domain” (Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, Ditto), 387
- Marin County, 55
- Medicare and Medicaid, 97, 171, 175, 178, 213, 217, 228–29, 232, 276
- Mettler, Suzanne, 173
- “Middle-Skill Jobs Lost in U.S. Labor Market Polarization,” 122–23
- Milliken v. Bradley* (1974), 49–50
- “Millions of Co-purchases and Reviews Reveal the Spread of Polarization” (Ruch, Decter-Frain, Batra), 398
- minorities: attitudes toward, 1, 28, 30, 69, 184–85, 303, 305, 351; Democratic Party and, 13, 106, 181, 274, 287; education and, 372; government support for, 173, 176; immigration and, 40; integration and, 170; intergroup contact and, 359–60; neighborhoods of, 50–51, 55; political power of, 308, 335, 386; Republican

- minorities (*continued*)
Party and, 350; Trump and, 33, 196, 244–45; voters, 151, 186, 191, 202, 266–67, 280, 354, 383. *See also* African Americans; Asian Americans; Hispanics and Latinos
- moral foundations theory, 387, 389–90, 392
- More in Common, 183–84
- “Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century” (Case, Deaton), 77
- Mother Jones*, 99
- multiracial and multiethnic coalition, 3, 218, 275, 375–76, 381
- multiracial democracy, 266, 353, 359
- The Myth of Digital Democracy*, 83
- “The Mythology of Trump’s ‘Working Class’ Support” (Silver), 136
- Nation*, 136
- National Affairs* (website), 233
- nationalists and nationalism, 84, 90, 96, 106–7
- National Labor Relations Act, 6
- National Review*, 1–2, 64
- The Nature of Prejudice* (Allport), 168, 360
- “Negative Partisanship” (Abramowitz, Webster), 238
- neighborhoods: affordable housing in, 55–56; concentrated poverty and, 52–53, 53f, 54; Moving to Opportunity experimental project, 52; social capital and, 43; tipping points, community, 51, 53
- neo-universalists, 379–80
- The New Majority* (Greenberg), 22
- New Republic*, 333, 405
- New Statesman*, 109
- New York Magazine*, 64, 230
- New York Review of Books*, 64, 69, 90, 369
- New York Times*, 16, 66
- nominations, presidential, 17, 33–34, 46, 91, 111, 136, 145, 208, 250, 350
- non-college-educated whites, 2, 19–20, 23, 78, 123, 133, 303, 308–9
- noncollege voters. *See* voters, white working-class
- “Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force” (Starr), 157
- non-marital childbirth. *See* families and children
- Obama administration, 146–47, 161, 213, 227
- Obamacare. *See* Affordable Care Act
- “On Modeling the Social-Psychological Foundations of Support for Donald Trump” (Enders, Uscinski), 353
- On Tyranny* (Snyder), 96
- “The Other 1%” (Lefgren), 176
- “Outsourcing Politics” (Issacharoff), 85
- “Partisan Schadenfreude and the Demand for Candidate Cruelty” (Webster, Glynn, Motta), 355
- partisanship and polarization: candidates and, 100; change in, 46, 202, 220; civil rights movement and, 1; divide, 288, 350; elections and, 256, 261; extremes of, 354–56, 399, 401; gender and, 387–88, 392; gerrymandering and, 191; hostility, 284, 373, 393–94, 405; identification, 28, 108, 110, 116–20, 203; nature of, 233–36; negative, 238–39, 287, 337, 349; opposing views and, 317; racial divide and, 149, 205, 217, 364; religion and, 301; Republicans and, 142, 172; school integration and, 359; SDT and, 9, 33; sorting, 4, 396; subconstituencies, 400; urban or rural, 79
- “Partisan Sorting and the Feminist Gap in American Politics” (Huddy, Willmann), 387
- “Past Place, Present Prejudice” (Goldman, Hopkins), 361
- “The Perils of Politicized Religion” (Campbell), 301
- Phillips Exeter Academy poll, 47
- polarization. *See* partisanship and polarization
- “Polarization under Rising Inequality and Economic Decline” (Stewart, McCarty, Bryson), 396–97
- Policy Tensor*, 227
- political consultants, 68, 276
- political correctness, 39, 112, 183, 219, 226, 311, 353
- political sectarianism, 284, 287–89
- “Political Sectarianism in America,” 284
- “Politicized Places” (Hopkins), 169
- Politico* magazine, 257, 295, 381
- Politics Is for Power* (Hersh), 280
- The Politics of Resentment* (Cramer), 69
- polls and surveys: American National Election Studies, 30, 107; American National Election Studies (ANES), 146–47, 184, 186, 205, 235–37; Axios poll, 141; Bloomberg poll, 38; Bright Line Watch, 138–39, 140f; Brilliant Corners Research & Strategies, 251; CBS News poll, 213–14; Democracy Fund Voter Study Group, 331; Gallup poll, 141, 143, 180, 182–83, 207–8, 275; Harvard/Harris survey, 332; Ipsos survey, 39;

- Kaiser Family Foundation, 208; NBC News / *Wall Street Journal* poll, 27–28, 120, 141, 212; NPR/PBS *NewsHour*/Marist Poll, 217; Pew survey, 48, 133–34, 148–50, 181, 183, 187, 196, 208, 332, 374, 376, 403; Politico / Morning Consult poll, 89; Public Opinion Research, 212; Public Opinion Strategies, 27–28, 152–53; Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), 114–15, 244, 301; Quinnipiac Poll, 143, 182, 250; Survey Monkey/Axios poll, 141–42; Third Way, 151; *USA Today*/ Ipsos poll, 332; Voter Study Group, 149; Washington Post/IPSOS poll, 39, 250; World Values Surveys, 93–94; YouGov survey, 117–18. *See also* Phillips Exeter Academy poll
- populism: causes of, 36, 38; economic insecurity and, 93, 95, 135; economic redistribution, 97; Europe and, 109–10; globalization of, 91–92, 327–28; government trust and, 38; men's employment and, 125; Trump and, 63, 84, 87, 90, 323, 353, 357; in the U. S., 309, 334–35
- "Populism and the American Party System" (Lee), 334
- The Populist Explosion* (Judis), 26
- Post and Courier*, 177
- postmaterialism, 1, 10–11, 13, 15, 81, 222
- Post-racial or Most-Racial?* (Tesler), 203
- poverty. *See* families and children
- poverty programs. *See* Medicare and Medicaid
- The Power Worshipers* (Stewart), 293
- prejudice, 371. *See also* racism
- "Preparing for a Disputed Presidential Election" (Foley), 253
- Presidential Election Panel Survey, 28–29
- progressives: Black Democrats and, 213; civil rights and, 1; Democrats and, 81, 146, 226, 278–80, 333, 335, 403–4; demographics of, 227; economic policies of, 228; electoral strategy, 231, 273–74; exit polls, 214; media and, 318; positions of, 183–86, 217, 230; tolerance levels of, 386; trends toward, 150; Trump and, 147, 208; white working class and, 24, 112; wokeness and, 337. *See also* Democratic Party
- "Projecting Confidence" (Westwood, Messing, Lelkes), 196
- "Proposal for Protecting Low-Income Workers" (Krueger, Posner), 155
- Proud Boys, 259, 300, 305
- PS: Political Science and Politics*, 67
- "The Psychological and Organizational Implications of Computer-Mediated Work" (Zuboff), 316
- purity tests, 58, 61
- QAnon, 308, 318
- "Race and Income in U.S. Suburbs" (Rastogi), 365
- "Racial Attitudes and American Politics" (Tesler), 203
- "Racial Attitudes and Political Correctness in the 2016 Presidential Election" (Grossmann), 219
- Racing Apart*, 391
- racism: attitudes toward, 337, 378; bigotry, 250, 339; conservatives and, 398–99; discrimination, 211; racial resentment, 28–29, 135–36, 184, 201, 205, 307–8, 362, 381; reduction of, 168, 360–62; residential segregation, 49–51, 167; voters and, 107, 108f, 166, 364, 381. *See also* neighborhoods; white supremacy and white supremacists
- RAND Corporation, 28–29
- red or blue America, 99–101, 103f, 142, 199, 220, 326–27
- regions, American: coastal, 81, 305; Midwest, 129, 172; Northeast, 47, 164; South, 1–2, 20, 32, 153, 160, 172, 174–75, 209, 266, 375; West, 13, 32, 82, 172, 234
- religion: churches, 71, 246, 297; evangelical Protestants, 71, 114–16, 295–98, 300–301, 308–9; morality and, 114–16; religiosity, 4, 215, 309; religious right, 13, 294, 296, 299, 301. *See also* Christian nationalism
- Republican Party: animosity toward Democrats, 99, 349–52; anti-Black bias, 20; conservatism of, 4; core constituency, 33; cultural politics and, 7; decline of, 225, 231, 264, 266–68; election loss as normative threat, 15; establishment wing of, 39–40; government control, 189; hard right, 110, 134, 172, 287, 309, 350; moderates and center-right, 39, 134, 231; racial discrimination and, 206, 209, 336; segregationist wing, 20; Tea Party, 13, 20, 23, 39; Trump and, 40, 69, 119–20, 133, 135–36, 202, 219, 327, 353, 357, 374; voter support, 74; working class coalition, 381. *See also* affluence, politics of top quartile; center-right coalition; conservatives; non-college-educated whites; racism; voters, white working-class

- Republican Theology* (Lynerd), 298
Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Goldstone), 285
“The Rigged Labor Market” (Krueger), 157
The Righteous Mind (Hadt), 57
right ideology. *See* conservatives; Republican Party
rights revolution, 1–2, 201, 209, 308, 403
RIP GOP (Greenberg), 225, 227
“The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements” (Krueger, Katz), 158
“The Rise of the Neo-universalists” (Halpin), 379
“Rising Inequality and the Case for Coalition Politics” (Wilson), 376
robotics. *See* labor
“Robots and Jobs” (Acemoglu, Restrepo), 132
“The Role of Cognitive Rigidity in Political Ideologies” (Zmigrod), 399
Rust Belt, 23–24, 68, 99
- safety net, 6, 47, 178, 309
Salon, 136
Say It Loud! (R. Kennedy), 338
schools and education, 54–55. *See also* Milliken v. Bradley
The Second Creation (Gienapp), 263
“The Second Demographic Transition” (Lesthaeghe), 30
second demographic transition (SDT), 7–11, 13–14, 30, 31f, 32–33, 101–2, 104, 104f.
See also postmaterialism
The Second Machine Age (Brynjolfsson, McAfee), 81, 160
Senate Intelligence Committee, 249
“Sex Differences in Moral Judgments across 67 Countries” (Atari), 391
“Shifting from Structural to Individual Attributions of Black Disadvantage” (Smith), 211
The Silent Revolution (Inglehart), 10
“The Silent Revolution in Europe” (Inglehart), 10
skills. *See* cognitive and noncognitive skills
SNAP (food stamps), 178
“The Social and Political Implications of Moral Conviction” (Skitka, Morgan), 305
social-cultural movements and issues, 13, 15, 28, 31–32, 47, 329, 345. *See also* gender equality
social dominance orientation, 59–60, 398
social economic stratification (SES), 346, 371
social media: African Americans, 249; democracy, 312–15; elections, 83, 86–88, 243–44; misinformation, 318–21; partisanship and polarization, 314–15, 317
Social Security, 2, 48, 171, 230
social welfare programs, 21, 171–73, 215, 235–36, 276, 305. *See also* Medicare and Medicaid; Social Security
The Space between Us (Enos), 163, 166, 168
“Spatial Aspects of the American ‘Culture War’” (Lesthaeghe, Neidert), 101
standardized tests. *See* cognitive and non-cognitive skills
Standing By (Armed Conflict Location Group), 259
state government legislation, 54–55
“The State of Competition and Dynamism” (Shambaugh, Nunn, Breitwieser, Liu), 191
The State of Working America, 6
status anxiety, 81, 107, 110, 219, 304
Steadfast Democrats (White, Laird), 247
“Straight Talk on Trade” (Rodrik), 68
“The Strange Liberal Backlash to Woke Culture” (Spaeth), 333–34
Strangers in Their Own Land (Hochschild), 369
“Superheroes for Change” (Napier, Huang, Vonasch, Bargh), 223
Supreme Court, 38, 49–50, 55, 155, 157, 161, 191, 258–59, 286–87, 289
- Taking America Back for God* (Whitehead, Perry), 293, 299
taxation: anti-redistributionist sentiment, 134–35; carried interest tax break, 14; Democrats and, 25, 47, 347; distributive injustice, 69; economic stress and, 285; increasing and decreasing, 118, 120, 142–43, 208, 214, 228, 232; liberal proposals, 6; middle-class tax cut, 21; Obama and, 46; racism and, 81; Trump and, 97, 177
tax havens, 194–95
technological revolution, 81–82, 84, 86–87, 312
technology, digital: communications and, 152, 314; industries, 77, 320; innovation and, 194; media, 315–16. *See also* gig economy
Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (2015), 55
“Theories of Power” (Keltner, Brinke), 304
“There Just Aren’t Enough College-Educated Voters!” (Teixeira), 377

- This Means War* (Locke), 294
“Threat Causes Liberals to Think like Conservatives” (Nail), 222
totalitarianism, 65, 69, 97
transgender, 15, 323, 331, 403. *See also* gay rights
“Trends in Educational Assortative Marriage from 1940 to 2003” (Schwartz, Mare), 306
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 38
“The Trouble with Boys” (Bertrand, Pan), 367
Trump administration, 16, 64, 91, 98, 129, 143, 178, 186, 190, 224, 248, 251, 382
“Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties” (Norris), 11
Trumpism, 92, 205, 268
Trump Nation at Home, 31t, 32
“Trump Was Supposed to Change the G.O.P.” (Coaston), 357
The Turner Diaries, 58
“The 2016 Election and the Left’s Lurch Left” (Goldberg), 184
UCLA Law Review, 50
Uncivil Agreement (Mason), 168, 234
unionization, 156, 159–60, 191, 310, 322
Unite the Right rally, 3
urban or rural communities: Democrats and, 102, 209, 272–74; despair of, 305; Electoral College and, 396; employment and, 76; political divide, 79, 81–82, 108, 404; Republicans and, 283; resentment of, 69
violence, post election, 260
Virtuous Violence (Fiske, Rai), 306
voters, college-educated, 3–4, 27–28, 183, 226, 229, 241, 376, 383
voters, suburban, 151, 181, 202, 209, 218, 273–74, 276, 376–77
voters, white working-class: Blacks and, 24–25; conservatives and, 26; deaths of despair, 77–79; Democratic defections, 375; Democratic quandary, 202; economic condition of, 34–37, 39, 94; Republicans and, 13, 15, 17, 21, 46; Trump and, 27, 306
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 1, 20
Vox, 96, 135, 337, 357
Wall Street Journal, 275
Washington Post, 30, 64–65, 97, 149, 190, 261, 274
“Wayward Sons” (Autor, Wasserman), 369
“We Have the Tools to Reverse the Rise in Inequality” (Blanchard, Rodrik), 347
“Welcome to the ‘Turbulent Twenties’” (Goldstone, Turchin), 285
welfare states, 11, 14, 99, 215, 309
“What Happened in 2020” (Ghitza), 376
What Happens When Democracies Become Perniciously Polarized? 394
“What Jobs Are Affected by A.I.?” (Muro), 326
What’s Going On? (Tate), 212
What Went Wrong for Congressional Democrats in 2020, 278–79
When Religion Becomes Evil (Kimball), 295
“When the Official Subject Is Presidential Politics.” (Edsall), 3
“Where Were Trump’s Votes?” (Porter), 68
white identity politics. *See* identity politics
White Identity Politics (Jardina), 216
“White People’s Racial Attitudes Are Changing to Match Partisanship” (Engelhardt), 236
white supremacy and white supremacists: American South and, 1; Capital assault and, 293, 295, 302, 304–5; Christian nationalism and, 298–300; First Amendment and, 386; police treatment of, 334, 382; tolerance for, 378; Trump and, 118, 147, 245, 252, 303, 349. *See also* Republican Party
White Too Long (Jones), 295
White Working Class Roundtable, 24
“Who Owns the Wealth in Tax Havens?” (Alstadsæter, Johannesen, Zucman), 194
“Why Attacking ‘Cancel Culture’ and ‘Woke’ People” (Bacon), 335
Why Cities Lose (Rodden), 272
“Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism?” (Rodrik), 327
“Why the South Must Prevail” (Buckley), 1
WikiLeaks, 65
wokeness, 151, 291, 311, 333, 335–38
Wolf, Tom, 255
women’s rights, 1, 4, 8, 27–30, 47, 102, 150, 308, 322
Workplace Prof Blog, 158
World Trade Organization, 36, 68
Wray, Christopher, 286